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AT  Territorial Administrator (Administrateur du Territoire) 
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DPS  Provisional health division (Division Provincial de Santé) 
EP  Protective equipment (équipement protective) 
ETC  Ebola Treatment Center 
EVD  Ebola Virus Disease 
FPIC  Free prior and informed consent 
INRB  National Institute of Biomedical Research (Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale) 
MPH   Ministry of Public Health 
MCZ  Medical Inspector of the Health Zone (Médecin Chef de Zone) 
MSF  Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) 
PA  Indigenous people (Peuple Autochtone) 
PBF  Performance-based financing 
PPE   Personal protective equipment 
RCCE  Risk communication and community engagement 
RECO  Community health workers (relais communautaire) 
SANRU  Rural Health Program (Projet Santé Rurale) 
SDB  Safe and dignified burial 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund 
USAID   United States Agency for International Development 
WHO  World Health Organization 
WFP  World Food Programme  
                                                          
1 The original French terms are written in italics and in parentheses. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report is for supervisors managing ongoing Ebola outbreaks, or working on preparedness and 
recovery activities in regions at risk of, or affected by, Ebola epidemics. It is based on rapid and intensive 
ethnographic field research in Equateur Province, Democratic Republic of Congo, undertaken less than 
a month after the epidemic was declared over in July 2018. The research comprised 60 separate open-
ended, semi-structured interviews with local health workers, government officials and administrators, 
Ebola survivors and their families, community leaders, and national and international responders.  
The overall finding of the report is that an Ebola epidemic, along with the way the response itself is 
conducted, can have significant social, psychological, economic, and health impacts for the 
communities involved. By providing a close, qualitative reportage on perceptions of the epidemic and 
the response in Equateur Province, the report aims to render tangible the social, political and economic 
dimensions of an Ebola epidemic and to offer recommendations for the response which prepare 
communities for life ‘post-Ebola’ at each stage of an intervention.  
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic in 
order to minimize the health, social and economic impacts of the epidemic. This report, Part Three: 
Recovery, which provides information and recommendations on the economic, health (including 
mental health), and social repercussions of the epidemic and response. It is part of a series which 
examines each one of the temporal stages of an epidemic from the report ‘Planning for Post-Ebola’ 
(Alcayna-Stevens 2018). The other reports in the series are: Part One: Preparedness, provides 
information and recommendations on emergence, surveillance and health system capacity, vulnerable 
and marginalized populations, and the political and economic context of the 2018 Equateur outbreak; 
and Part Two: Response, which provides information and recommendations on transmission, risk 
communication, contact tracing, vaccine deployment, case management, and burials. An index can be 
found at the end of the report to locate cross-cutting themes covered in multiple sections. 
The report provides recommendations relevant for supervisors working on risk communication, 
coordination, surveillance and contact tracing, infection prevention and control, case management, and 
safe & dignified burials (SDBs). Recommendations are divided into those that are operational (i.e. 
immediately applicable in the event of an outbreak) and those that are orientated toward long-term 
capacity building. Key recommendations are presented at the beginning of each section and are 
brought together in the overall conclusion.  
The series proposes a Grassroots Model for Epidemic Response, based on four key principles: (1) A 
‘whole society’ approach that attends not only to those individuals directly affected by the outbreak, 
but also to their broader communities; (2) a commitment to inclusivity appreciates that ‘communities’ 
are not homogenous, and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations; (3) 
an attention to local stakes that can help responders appreciate why Ebola epidemics are understood 
through the lens of broader issues such as politics, economics and religion; and finally, (4) a 
commitment to utilizing pre-existing epidemic response capacity in order to coordinate an effective 
response and ensures that interventions build on the social and cultural resources of the communities 
they seek to support. 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA 
 
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic. Each 
of the reports in this series examines one of these temporal stages. During ‘preparedness’, the focus is 
on reducing vulnerability to disaster and strengthening capacity, surveillance and early detection. 
‘Response’ begins with a coordinated and rapid investigation, and then the implementation of 
appropriate control and case management, which is supported at each step and in every aspect by 
robust, clear and two-way communication. Finally, ‘recovery’ focuses on evaluation and accompanies 
affected communities in their lives ‘post-Ebola.’ Each stage should seek to minimise the health, social 
and economic impacts of the epidemic.  
 
  
PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
 
GRASSROOTS MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RESPONSE 
 
(1) A ‘WHOLE SOCIETY’ APPROACH attends not only to those individuals directly  
affected by the outbreak, but also to their broader communities.  
 
(2) A COMMITMENT TO INCLUSIVITY appreciates that ‘communities’ are not 
homogenous  
and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations. 
 
(3) ATTENDING TO LOCAL PERSPECTIVES can help responders appreciate why Ebola 
epidemics  
are understood through alternative lenses and broader issues, such as politics,  
economics and religion.  
 
(4) UTILIZING PRE-EXISTING EPIDEMIC RESPONSE CAPACITY ensures that interventions 
build on  
the social and cultural resources of the communities they seek to support.  
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: 
RECOVERY 
 
For an Ebola outbreak to be officially declared over, two incubation periods (a total of 42 days) must 
pass without any confirmed cases. Traditionally, recovery efforts focus on governments driving the safe 
reactivation of essential health services and tackling pre-existing health system constraints that 
contributed to delayed detection and early spread of the virus. Immediate recovery efforts should lay 
the foundations for a stronger, more resilient health system, and thus feed back into preparedness. 
However, the research conducted in preparation for this report has suggested that recovery should be 
conceptualized beyond the improvement of health services and should encompass the broader psycho-
social and economic impacts of the epidemic. This section of the report provides detail on the 
challenges with which communities and individuals affected by the 2018 Equateur outbreak continue 
to struggle, and to suggest an approach to Ebola epidemics which would plan for life ‘post-Ebola’ at 
each stage of the response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
RECOVERY
PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE
Capacity-building recommendation 
The survivors’ association, ANVE, should be assisted in establishing local 
support groups for those directly affected by the epidemic, as well as 
supported in reaching out to other survivor groups in West Africa and DRC. 
Operational recommendation 
Prioritize the de-stigmatization of affected 
communities by neighboring villages so that markets 
and other economic activities can resume as soon as 
the epidemic is declared over.  
Capacity-building recommendation 
Long-term investment in affected communities should be an 
integral part of response efforts. Efforts should be made to 
provide school fees for children of victims and of survivors, 
and widows, widowers and/or the parents of victims should 
be provided with a donation to contribute to funerary 
expenses and customary debts. 
Operational recommendation 
In order to minimize inter-generational and intra-communal 
conflict, village elders should be asked to suggest young people 
from different families interested in working. Employees should 
work in shifts or on rotation, with adequate rest days built in so 
that they can work on their fields. 
Operational recommendation 
Social scientists should work with national 
and regional authorities to minimize 
embezzlement and corruption as it relates 
to Ebola resources. 
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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3. RECOVERY 
 
3.1 ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Response teams must consider from the outset the kinds of enduring impacts their presence could have on 
local economies. This section outlines the significant economic impacts that an Ebola epidemic has on 
survivors, their families, the families of victims, and broader communities. It also examines the unintended 
economic impacts that the Ebola response teams have on local economies and on the economic conditions 
of individual families. 
3.1.1 COST OF LIVING 
Itipo village became one of the epicenters of the 
epidemic, and had, at one point, teams of over 
200 national and international personnel. While 
much of their food and equipment was brought in 
by helicopter, the response teams nonetheless 
consumed some local goods, including domestic 
livestock, water (for washing) and products for 
sale at the market.  
One of the most common complaints we heard 
against these response teams, was that they had 
increased the cost of living for ordinary people. As 
one man explained, with reference to the PA who 
Nkundo people employ to work in their fields: 
This increase in the cost of labor was due to the 
fact that workers were being paid up to 8,000FC 
for a day’s work (such as digging latrines or 
building fences) and had therefore begun to 
refuse the exploitatively low pay that they had 
received in the past for hard agricultural labor. 
Others found work for the response washing 
clothes, fetching water, acting as security guards 
or building structures. All of these activities had 
an impact on local labor economies, just as the 
sale of domestic livestock at ‘foreigner prices’ 
(ntalo ya mindele in Lingala), impacted the market 
price of livestock. 
The relatively sudden imbalances in wealth 
between those who had worked for the response 
and those who had not, also created a lot of 
resentment and bad feeling (motema mabe in 
Lingala) between neighbors and friends, and 
within families. In some cases, the employment of 
young men, and their rapid acquisition of wealth, 
led to intergenerational conflict. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Social scientists should be deployed to conduct 
research with communities to determine potential 
impacts and conduct a rapid assessment based on 
a study of local economies and the labor and 
resources the response team will require  
›› Social scientists should also assess the impacts 
of privileging one generation over another in terms 
of employment. It may be beneficial to ask all 
village elders to suggest several young people from 
their own family who would be interested in 
working, so that certain families do not benefit 
more than others. 
3.1.2 FOOD CRISIS 
Several nurses, particularly in the smallest 
villages, who were very concerned about a 
looming food crisis. They spoke of an alarming rise 
in the number of malnourished children they 
were seeing. They attributed this to the following 
6 factors: 
(1) While working for the response, people had 
neglected work in their fields; (2) Survivors 
suffering from post-Ebola syndrome, and families 
decimated by the epidemic no longer had the 
labor-power necessary to work on their fields; (3) 
Contacts – as well as others in the community – 
had stayed away from their fields out of necessity 
(to stay isolated and not to travel), or fear, during 
the active outbreak; (4) Due to the effects of the 
response on the local economy, people were now 
unable to afford the (PA) agricultural labor they 
had previously relied upon; (5) Fear and stigma 
during and immediately after the epidemic meant 
“We used to pay 1,000FC for a 
field, now we have to pay 
2,000FC or more!” 
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that, on the one hand, people were prevented 
from selling their agricultural or forest products in 
other villages, and on the other hand, traders no 
longer game to sell goods in their villages; (6) Fear 
surrounding bushmeat meant that children were 
no longer receiving an important source of 
protein, and were increasingly presenting to 
health centers with kwashiorkor.  
Several members of the community expressed 
frustration and resentment that only directly-
affected families had received food aid, and yet 
the food crisis would affect almost everyone. 
Operational recommendations 
›› During the outbreak, labor should be divided in 
a predictable, rather than haphazard fashion, so 
that people do not waste the morning hours (when 
much agricultural labor is undertaken) waiting at 
the coordination office to see if they will be offered 
work.  All employees and laborers should work in 
shifts or on rotation, with adequate rest days built 
in so that they can work on their fields.  
›› Communications teams should prioritize the de-
stigmatization of affected communities in the 
surrounding region, so that markets and other 
economic activities can resume as soon as the 
epidemic is declared over. 
›› Response teams and their local partners should 
consider providing victims, survivors and contacts 
who were unable to undertake subsistence 
activities during the active phase of the epidemic 
with pest-resistant seeds of manioc, rice, soy, 
legumes and vegetables to kick-start their 
subsistence activities. 
3.1.3 LOST PROPERTY 
The first complaint of every affected family which 
participated in the research, was that response 
teams (Croix Rouge RDC) had burned items 
belonging to the patient or the deceased and had 
not replaced those items nor offered 
compensation. This has also been reported for 
previous epidemics.2  
For the families involved, these were often 
valuable items, which were difficult to replace, or 
required monetary resources which they did not 
possess, such as beds and mattresses. One man 
explained to us that his mobile phone had been 
                                                          
2 Epelboin et al (2008).  
destroyed when decontamination teams sprayed 
him and his possessions with chlorine. 
Some people acknowledged that they had 
received small tokens of compensation, but the 
majority assured us that they had received no 
replacement or compensation for their loss. The 
experience was often a traumatic one which 
people felt augmented stigmatization. 
The issue was even more complex in cases 
where families had, in fear and panic, destroyed 
or threw away other items, such as pots and pans, 
without instruction from response teams.  
Operational recommendation 
›› It is important that communications teams 
address clearly which personal possessions run the 
risk of contaminating others (e.g. soiled 
mattresses), and which do not (e.g. metal pots and 
pans). 
3.1.4 DEBT AND FUNERARY COSTS 
When a man dies, his widow becomes responsible 
for the debts he had accrued while alive. These 
debts are often connected to the family’s home 
(building a house out of durable materials such as 
bricks or a tin roof, adding doors, building beds or 
tables). Sometimes they are for purchases such as 
a radio or bicycle. In any case, they were always 
incurred by a family with the anticipation that the 
couple’s combined labor would eventually result 
in the debt being paid off. When one person dies 
– and especially when this is the husband – the 
widow(er) finds themselves in a very difficult 
situation, often unable to pay off the debt. 
Widow(er)s often have many children 
(sometimes up to 12). Not all of these are 
biological children, but they remain children for 
whom the couple was responsible. Caring for 
these children without the help of their spouse 
also becomes incredibly difficult, especially as 
older children’s school fees become increasingly 
expensive. Several widows lamented that they no 
longer had the money to pay for children who 
were in their final year of school and who had 
been progressing well and had been hoping to 
pass their secondary school certificate that year. 
These economic difficulties are compounded by 
the fact that funerals and funerary rituals are 
themselves very expensive. Families must pay for 
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the coffin and burial, but they must also provide 
food, drink and housing for all of the extended 
family and friends who arrive to mourn the 
deceased. Often, the mourning period does not 
end until one final day of celebration and feasting 
is organized, meaning that bereaved families who 
cannot afford to organize a large feast, must 
continue feeding guests while they try to gather 
the resources necessary for the feast.  
Other families explained that when they 
travelled to the ETC for treatment, or to be close 
to a sick relative, or during the extended 
mourning period, household items and domestic 
livestock had been destroyed, consumed or 
stolen by neighbors, in-laws and guests. On top of 
these costs, widow(er)s must typically pay a 
customary fine (called nongo in Lingala) to their 
in-laws when their spouse dies. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Provide school fees for children of victims 
(orphans) and of survivors, often unable to work 
because of post-Ebola syndrome, for one year.  
›› Provide widows, widowers and/or the parents of 
victims with a donation to contribute to funerary 
expenses and customary debts. 
3.1.5 EMBEZZLEMENT & UNFULFILLED 
PROMISES 
Dozens of stories circulate in Equateur about the 
embezzlement of Ebola funds. Communities 
which were not directly affected by the outbreak 
say that the epidemic was fabricated in order to 
attract the funding of big international donors. 
Those who were directly affected lament the fact 
that they ‘have not benefitted’ while national and 
regional elites and international respondents 
have made thousands of dollars through their 
participation in the response. 
Stories also circulated among both affected 
communities and international response teams 
that local administrative leaders have embezzled 
not only Ebola funds, but the material and 
equipment, such as motorbikes and electric 
generators, which (it is said) were intended for 
affected communities or rural hospitals and 
health centers. 
Several of the RECO who participated in the 
research expressed anger that their names had 
not appeared on the lists of RECO who received a 
‘bonus’ directly from the Minister of Health. 
Many pointed to corruption and nepotism on the 
part of their superiors. 
While the finger of blame is sometimes pointed 
at specific individuals in positions of power, other 
people are not as sure about who is to blame for 
the fact that the most affected communities feel 
dispossessed. For many people, the differences 
between different international actors and NGOs 
are not clear. Oftentimes, they were grouped 
together, and (as perceived representatives of 
UNICEF) so were we, with many people asking us 
(botiki bisu kaka boye? In Lingala): 
When people spoke of seeing ‘no visible impact’, 
they were referring to the vast displays of wealth 
they had witnessed with the logistics (cars, 
motorbikes, helicopters, airplanes, electric 
generators) of the response, and the fact that, 
despite still being in need (many thousands more 
people will die from malaria than Ebola in 
Equateur this year), they would no longer benefit 
from this when the response teams left. This led 
to protests when NGOs began to pull out their 
personnel and equipment to assist in Beni. 
Part of the reason for this disappointment was 
a conviction that various actors – politicians, 
national and international responders, and local 
administrators – had promised to leave this 
equipment for affected communities, or build 
hospitals, health centers and maternity clinics.  
Response teams should never make promises 
about the support which will follow an Ebola 
outbreak, unless they will be part of a program 
funded to undertake this – differences between 
humanitarian assistant and development work 
should be emphasized. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Response teams should work with national and 
regional authorities to minimize embezzlement 
and corruption as it relates to Ebola resources. 
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› Long-term investment in affected communities 
should be an integral part of response efforts, at 
least for a one-year recovery period. 
“So, you are just going to leave 
us like this?” 
PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: RECOVERY | 11  
 
3.2 HEALTH IMPACTS 
This section outlines the impacts that EVD has on survivors’ health, including their mental health and the 
psycho-social impacts of monitoring Ebola survivors for a lingering infection which could lead them to be 
contagious to others. It also considers the mental and physical health of EVD survivors who were never 
registered and feelings of exclusion and resentment towards the response. 
3.2.1 POST-EBOLA SYNDROME 
Until the West Africa crisis, post-Ebola syndrome 
was a rumored but little-studied after-effect of 
EVD. Symptoms include joint and muscle pain, 
eye problems, including blindness, various 
neurological problems, and other ailments. 
Most of the survivors who participated in the 
research alluded to continuous ill health, physical 
pain and in some cases, neurological conditions 
such as confusion and forgetfulness, and mental 
health problems connected to trauma. Several 
people spoke of conditions (pain and weakness) 
so severe that they were still unable to work. 
ALIMA is currently following all survivors in 
order to monitor this syndrome, and is also 
treating certain conditions, such as the eye 
problems. While an earlier report suggested that, 
towards the end of the epidemic (early July 2018), 
this monitoring was burdensome on survivors 
because it was extensive and almost daily,3 during 
our interviews (September 2018), survivors had 
undergone some time without surveillance, and 
were eager for the check-ups and treatment to 
begin again. They were particularly concerned 
with finding treatment for their joint pain. Where 
these visits had caused them to feel some shame 
before, they were now welcomed as a 
continuation of care. 
It is important to follow EVD survivors in order 
to determine the varied symptoms following EVD 
infection and to determine the best care. 
However, a delicate balance must be struck 
between continuing the care of EVD survivors and 
burdening their time with too many tests and 
check-ups. 
3.2.2 MENTAL HEALTH 
Mental health is a very important issue in rural 
Congo, even as it is almost completely neglected 
by national biomedical structures. Following an 
Ebola epidemic, mental health issues arise from 
                                                          
3 Duda (2018).  
4 IASC (2008; 2015).  
the trauma of the disease, from the trauma of 
losing family members, and from the social 
stigmatization experienced by many EVD 
survivors. 
Mental health requires a ‘whole of society’ 
approach, and psychological support should be 
accompanied by communication which reduce 
stigma in the broader community.4 Families of 
victims, especially widows and orphaned children, 
are also in need of continued psycho-social 
support. If resources permit, women should have 
the possibility of talking to female psychologists.  
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› After the epidemic, survivors should be 
supported by the creation of community support 
groups, which can be established in collaboration 
with ANVE. 
3.2.3 SEXUAL TRANSMISSION OF EBOLA 
Viral traces of Ebola have been found to persist in 
semen, vaginal secretions and breastmilk after a 
patient recovers and no longer has any detectable 
virus in other bodily fluids.5 In West Africa, there 
have been cases of the sexual transmission of 
Ebola, and of the transmission from mother to 
breastfeeding infant. 
One important part of ALIMA’s post-Ebola 
check-ups, is to monitor the virus in the body 
fluids of survivors. However, the possibility of 
remaining contagious is one of the sources of 
stigmatization against which survivors must 
struggle, and so the ALIMA teams must make sure 
that these investigations do not jeopardize the 
social standing of their patients.  
There are also challenges in getting survivors to 
use condoms during sexual intercourse, as 
condoms are often associated with disease or 
with a socially unacceptable level of sexual 
promiscuity.  
5 Sissoko et al (2017).  
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EVD survivors have emphasized the need for 
those conducting tests on body fluids to be non-
local staff, to assure that their confidentiality is 
protected. In order to minimize the stigma which 
could be attached to such tests, they should be 
conducted as part of a comprehensive check-up. 
Efforts should be made to minimize alarm in the 
community, while providing survivors with the 
information necessary to protect themselves and 
others. 
Operational recommendation 
›› In order to destigmatize the use of condoms and 
encourage EVD survivors to use them, village-wide 
regional campaigns should be undertaken to 
encourage their use.  
3.2.4 UNREGISTERED PATIENTS 
Following the epidemic, some health actors have 
felt overwhelmed and frustrated by the number 
of unregistered patients who have subsequently 
claimed to have had Ebola. 
Many of the health actors who participated in 
the research attributed this to the support EVD 
survivors and families of victims have received 
during and following the epidemic. They claim 
that those who may have had Ebola, but who fled 
the response out of fear (and perhaps even some 
people who were sick but did not have Ebola) are 
now making claims so that they too may benefit 
from this support. 
This is a challenging ethical question with no 
easy answer: What to do with those people who 
were sick, but were too afraid to collaborate with 
the Ebola response teams during the outbreak? 
Do they deserve the same level of care as other 
patients who passed through the ETCs? Or should 
they receive no care in order to encourage people 
to collaborate with the system if they wish to 
benefit from it? 
This question becomes all the more pressing 
when one considers the EVD survivors and 
families of victims who were affected at the onset 
of the epidemic when the response had not yet 
arrived. As a family member of the first confirmed 
case of Ebola, in Ikoko Impenge village, told us, 
referring to international response team 
personnel: 
 
  
“We were the first to fall sick, 
and yet we have not benefitted 
from your presence.” 
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3.3 SOCIAL IMPACTS 
This section outlines the enduring social repercussions of the Ebola epidemic, and draws attention to 
organizations, such as the National Association of Ebola Vanquishers (ANVE), which can be collaborated with 
and supported in order to aid both survivors and their broader communities.   
3.3.1 STIGMA 
Stigma is multifaceted and has had an impact on 
many different people; from local healers or 
Batwa who were thought to be at the origin of the 
Ebola ‘curse’, to survivors, families of victims, and 
local health actors, who, in some cases, continue 
to be referred to as ‘contaminated.’  
For the latter, this is often expressed through 
avoidance and rejection, with several health 
workers and survivors telling us that they have 
been unable to visit family members, who refuse 
to offer them food and housing. It is also 
experienced in the form of mockery and jeering.  
People often fear direct contact, although they 
may also refuse to eat food cooked by a survivor, 
or to touch goods or money handled by a survivor. 
This fear may be particularly acute because of the 
ongoing follow-up exams, which seek to monitor 
the presence of the virus in survivors’ body fluids.  
Many RECO and doctors have experienced a 
rejection by some members of society, initially 
because they were rumored to be collaborating 
with a project to infect people with Ebola for 
financial gain, and subsequently because of the 
large amounts of money they are said to have 
made by participating in the coordination.  
On the other hand, some rural health actors 
have found themselves mocked for having lost so 
much money during the epidemic, and for being 
unable to afford their children’s school fees. See 
also, 2.3.4: Free health care.  
Discrimination of survivors and the families of 
victims is ongoing and should continuously be 
addressed by the response, including in the 
months following the end of the epidemic.6   
Celebrations organized when survivors leave 
ETCs, in which broader communities can 
participate, and are reassured that it is safe to 
interact with survivors, are an excellent way of 
reintegrating survivors. 
 
                                                          
6 ERAP (2014); Arwady et al (2014).  
 
Capacity-building recommendations 
›› Stigmatization of survivors can be minimized by 
donating sewing machines, bicycle repair kits to 
ANVE, so that survivors can play a more important 
role in the community. 
›› ANVE should be supported in the establishment 
of support groups for those directly affected by the 
epidemic, so that it can reach out to more isolated 
families and survivors, who do not live in proximity 
to its base in Itipo.  
›› ANVE should also be supported in reaching out 
to other survivor groups in West Africa, in creating 
a national network in DRC and in applying for funds 
for its own projects. 
3.3.2 TORN SOCIAL FABRIC 
Fear of contagion led many people to stop 
shaking hands, to distance themselves physically 
from others, to stop visiting others and to limit 
their attendance at funerals. This fear and lack of 
trust continues to erode relationships and to 
make people feel afraid and isolated. 
Many people describe the epidemic as akin to 
‘war’. They are referring to the chaos, the fear, 
the ways in which they had to mobilize all their 
resources in the fight to stop the disease, and in 
the losses they suffered. 
Several people told us that their pain would be 
ease if a hospital, a maternity ward, a school, or 
another symbolic building could be constructed 
or refurbished in order to mark this momentous 
event and honor those whose lives were lost.  
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› A ‘whole society’ approach should be used to 
develop plans with affected communities for 
appropriate memorialization of the epidemic, its 
victims and the sacrifices and losses of affected 
communities. 
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